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136 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-
DETERMINABLE FEE 
A 1929 deed which conveyed land from private individuals 
to a city provided : ". . . . In the event said lands . . . shall not 
be kept and maintained as a park . . . for use by the white race 
only ... the lands hereby conveyed shall revert in fee simple .... " 
In 1955 a declaratory judgment was sought to determine the val-
idity of the restriction and reverter clauses. Held: the opera-
tion of such language created a fee simple determinable with a 
possibility of reverter. Since such reversion would be automatic 
and would not require any judicial enforcement by state courts, 
negroes who desired to use the park facilities would not be de-
prived of equal protection of the laws by state action.1 
The instant case is of interest not only because of the court's 
holding; but also, because of the presence of two other problems 
which the court does not discuss. First, is the maintenance of 
the park by the city an action of the state which is within the 
proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment?2 Second, is the re-
striction illegal? 
Prior to the decisions of 19483 the problem of land transac-
tions involving privately imposed racial restrictions had not been 
viewed as a proqlem of constitutional law. Rather, racial restric-
tions upon the use and occupancy of land were enforced upon 
various grounds.4 However, the decision in Shelley v. Kraemer5 
1 Charlotte Park· and Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 88 S.E.2d 114 
(N.C. 1955). 
2 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: " .... No State shall ... deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
3 Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 
1 (1948). 
4 Edwards v. West Woodridge Theater Co., 55 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 
1931) (restriction does not deprive citizen of any constitutional right); 
Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679 (1946) (give effect 
to intention of parties); Dooley v. Savannah Bank and Trust Co., 199 
Ga. 353, 34 S.E.2d· 522 (1945) (protection of property value to which 
restriction applied); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 
(1918) (not an unlawful restraint or against public policy); Queens-
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dearly established the proposition that specific enforcement of 
such agreements by state courts is prohibited by the "equal protec-
tion" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Likewise, if a state court awards damages for breach 
of a covenant restricting the use and occupancy of real property 
to persons of the Caucasian race, non-Caucasians a.re deprived 
of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 6 
The deed in the case at hand is not, as in Shelley v. Kraemer, 
a contract between private individuals; rather, the deed here pro-
vides that the city maintain the lands as a park. This provision 
puts the city in the position of discriminating against non-Cau-
casians. A city is a political subdivision of the state.7 Thus, any 
action taken by the city is an action of the state.8 
It is submitted that had the court considered this aspect of 
the problem it could only have rendered a judgment that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the city from maintaining a 
park which discriminates against any race. Such a restriction 
is illegal; thus, it should be declared void and the fee of the first 
taker rendered absolute.9 Validity at time of inception does not 
legitimatize a restriction which is subsequently declared to be 
illegal.1° Thus, the result would not be altered even if it were 
argued that such racial restrictions were not held to be illegal at 
the time of the conveyance. 
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borough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915) (liberty 
of contract). 
5 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
6 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
7 City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Ry., 196 U.S. 539 
(1905); Texas Nat. Guard Armory Board v. l\IcCraw, 132 Tex. 613, 126 
S.W.2d 627 (1939); Streat v. Vermilya, 268 l\Iich. 1, 255 N.W. 604 
(1934); Loeb v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 429, 134 So. 205 (1931). 
s George v. City of Portland, 114 Ore. 418, 235 Pac. 681 (1925). 
9 Cf. VI American Law of Property § 26.34 (Supp. 1954). Clifton 
v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (here it is not clear 
whether the court construed the condition as a condition subsequent 
with a right of re-entry or a determinable fee with a possibility of re-
verter); Ruhland v. King, 154 Wis. 545, 143 N.W. 681 (1913). 
10 See Board of Comm'rs of l\Iahoning County v. Young, 59 Fed. 96 
(6th Cir. 1893); Scovill v. l\Icl\Iahon, 62 Conn. 378, 26 Atl. 479 (1892). 
